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* Honorable A rthur L. Alarcon, Senior Circuit Judge for the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 02-2331
___________
KATHY MAGISTRINI
Appellant
v.
ONE HOUR MARTINIZING DRY CLEANING; MARTIN FRANCHISES, INC.;
DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY; R.R. STREET & CO, INC.
JOHN DOE MANUFACTURERS, (1-50);
JILL DOES SUPPLIERS/DISTRIBUTORS, (51-100)
___________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
(D.C. Civil No. 96-cv-04991)
District Judge:  The Honorable Faith S. Hochberg
___________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 11, 2003
BEFORE: SLOVITER, NYGAARD, and ALARCON,* Circuit Judges.
2(Filed: June 25, 2003)
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.
Kathy Magistrini appeals a District Court’s Daubert hearing order that
precluded testimony from her causation expert. Magistrini also challenges the District
Court’s decision to admit certain testimony for the sole purpose of the Daubert hearing
and to employ Dr. Mark Weiss as a technical advisor.
When a party seeks to admit expert testimony, the District Court must make
an initial determination, in a preliminary hearing under Fed. R. Evid. 104(a), that the
requirements of Fed. R. Evid. 702 have been met. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).   Rule 702 imposes a special obligation on the District Judge to
“ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
reliable.” Id. at 589.
In assessing whether proffered scientific expert testimony is reliable, we
have explained that the District Court should admit expert testimony “if there are ‘good
grounds’ for the expert's conclusion” notwithstanding the judge's belief that there are
better grounds for some alternative conclusion.  Heller v. Shaw, 167 F.3d 146, 152-53 (3d
Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).  The District Court must also “examine the expert's
3conclusions in order to determine whether they could reliably follow from the facts
known to the expert and the methodology used.”  Id. at 153.  However, “nothing in either
Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion
evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.   A court
may conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered.”  General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 145-46 (1997).
We review the District Court’s decision to exclude or admit testimony
under Daubert, as well as to employ a technical advisor, for abuse of discretion.  To
demonstrate abuse, Appellant must show that the District Court’s based “its opinion on a
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an erroneous legal conclusion, or an improper
application of law to fact.”  LaSalle Nat. Bank v. First Conn. Holding Group, L.L.C.
XXIII, 287 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 2002).
Inasmuch as the District Court has already set forth the factual and
procedural history of this case, we need not repeat that history here.  See Magistrini v.
One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, et al., 180 F.Supp. 2d 584 (D. N.J. 2002).  The
District Court has carefully and completely explained its reasons for excluding the
testimony of Appellant’s causation expert and admitting other testimony in its thoughtful
Memorandum Opinion and Order.  The District Court did not abuse its discretion.  It
properly conducted the Daubert hearing, applied the correct legal standard, and made no
clearly erroneous findings of fact.  Given the District Court’s careful analysis, no purpose
4will be served by this court undertaking a redundant discussion simply to reach the same
result.  The District Court’s actions in selecting a technical advisor were also well within
its discretion.
Accordingly, we will affirm the decision of the District Court for
substantially the reasons set forth in the District Court’s thoughtful Memorandum
Opinion without further elaboration.
_________________________
TO THE CLERK:
Please file the foregoing opinion.
/s/ Richard L. Nygaard
Circuit Judge
